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Abstract 
The “aging employee” has recently become a hot topic in many fields of behavioural research. With 
the aim to determine the effects of different incentive schemes (competition, social or increased 
monetary incentives) on performance of young and older subjects, we look at behaviour of a group 
of younger and older adults on a well‐established real effort task. We show that older adults differ 
from younger adults in their performance in all conditions, but not in the improvement between 
conditions. The age difference in performance is however driven by women. While we replicate the 
gender difference in competitiveness found in the literature, we do not find a significant age 
difference in competitiveness. Social incentives have an at least as strong or even stronger effect on 
performance than increased monetary incentives. This effect is driven by men; women do not show 
an increase in performance with social incentives. 
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Introduction 
“The aging society” has recently become the focus of attention both of popular media and of 
scientific research. Psychologists, cognitive (neuro‐)scientists and empirical economists, among 
others, study how age affects decision making and outcomes of decision making in many domains of 
life (Schonberg et al., 2011). 
The few experimental studies that so far have looked at age effects on economic decision making 
have compared age groups without testing specific hypotheses based on psychological knowledge 
about life span changes. In these studies, few differences have been found (e.g. Kovalchik et al., 
2005; Charness and Villeval, 2007). Research in cognitive psychology however has shown the 
existence of age differences in decision making: some studies find that older people are more risk 
averse than younger people, while others do not confirm this result (Carstensen and Hartel, 2006; 
Mata et al., 2011). In our own research (Sproten et al., mimeo), we show that older adults do not 
differentiate in the propensity to gamble under risk or ambiguity, whereas young adults do. It also 
has been shown that older adults follow different goals than younger individuals in decision making 
and are more motivated to keep a positive affective state (e.g. Carstensen et al, 1999; Mather, 2006).  
In many western countries, there is presently a debate on increasing the retirement age to balance 
the accounts of pension systems. In France, the retirement age will be increased stepwise from 
currently 60 years to 62 years in 2018; in Germany, it has recently been raised to 67 years.  In the 
light of this, one especially important aspect is whether older subjects in a work setting can be 
incentivized with the same incentives as young subjects. We take a first step towards an answer 
using controlled experiments. We base our research on a well‐established experimental design and 
extend it beyond different monetary incentives to social incentives. 
There are various theories in the field of cognitive psychology that explain why the reaction to 
different types of incentives should change over the life‐span. We base our experiment on one of the 
most comprehensive theories, called social production functions‐successful ageing theory or SPF-SA 
(Steverink & Lindenberg, 2006; Steverink et al., 1998). The SPF is a theory of motivation of behaviour 
that implies a hierarchy of universal needs, instrumental goals and resources. For reasons of 
simplicity we will focus here mainly on the universal needs dimension and refer the interested reader 
to Steverink’s article on the topic. Needs are in this theory understood as a restricted set of basic 
physical and social needs that must be at least minimally fulfilled to achieve wellbeing. Needs are 
universal, inherent, and relevant to people of all ages. Goals and resources are the instruments by 
which needs can be fulfilled. People are inclined to maintain and improve levels of need satisfaction. 
There are three basic social needs: the need for affection (e.g. love, relationships), the need for 
behavioural confirmation (e.g. doing the “right” thing in the eyes of relevant others), and the need 
for status (e.g. being treated with respect). 
The SPF‐SA theory is an extension of the SPF theory. The latter posits that there are age‐related 
changes in the availability of resources for need satisfaction, with affection relatively more age proof 
than the two others as it depends less on performance. Two main processes guide these changes: 
‐ A patterned change in the availability of resources for the satisfaction of the three social 
needs over the life span: status satisfaction is the most difficult to maintain, followed by 
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behavioural confirmation, and the satisfaction of the need for affection is the easiest to 
maintain in relation to the two other needs. 
‐ A process of compensation and substitution regarding the social need satisfaction over the 
life course. Behavioural confirmation and affection are substitutes of and compensate for 
decline in status need satisfaction, and affection need satisfaction also compensates and 
substitutes for the decline in behavioural confirmation need satisfaction. 
Hence SPF‐SA claims that gains in affection need satisfaction are more prominent in older adults than 
in young adults, the latter being more status and behavioural confirmation oriented. 
 
The design we use has originally been used by Niederle & Versterlund (2007) to study gender 
differences in the reaction to incentives. In this experiment, subjects can earn money by solving real‐
effort tasks (summing up two‐digit numbers). They start out with a piece‐rate payment scheme, 
followed by a winner‐takes‐it‐all competition in groups of four. In a third round, subjects can choose 
whether they prefer a competitive incentive scheme or a piece‐rate incentive scheme for this round. 
Round four enables participants to select whether to be paid in a piece rate or competitive incentive 
scheme for round one. We added a fifth round to the original four rounds of the Niederle and 
Vesterlund experiment to investigate the motivational effects of social versus monetary incentives. 
There is no relative feedback given during the game, but subjects learn for each sum they calculated 
whether it was wrong or correct. After all rounds have been played, participants are asked to 
indicate how they would rank themselves in each part and the accuracy of this ranking is 
incentivized. Niederle & Vesterlund report a significant gender difference in choice. Women are less 
willing to enter a competition than men, such that – based on performance – too few women, but 
too many men enter the competition. By now many papers replicate findings of the earlier studies 
with different age and cultural groups (e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004, Gneezy et al, 2008, Dreber et 
al., 2009), but in terms of age groups they all focus on younger rather than older subjects – usually 
children or teens. 
In the current study, we can show that older adults seem to differ from younger adults in their 
performance in all conditions, but not in the reaction to incentives. The age difference in 
performance is driven by women; men do not differ on any of the performance measures. We 
replicate also the gender difference in competitiveness found generally in the literature: women 
enter a tournament less often than men. This holds for both age groups, while there is no general 
age difference.  
We also show that the two factors that explain most of the variance in tournament entry are the 
gender of participants and their self‐ranking (i.e., a measure of self‐confidence). Participants who are 
more confident about their relative performance are more likely to compete than participants who 
are less confident. Furthermore, women are less likely to compete, a result that also holds when 
controlling for absolute and believed performance. Age and actual performance on the other hand 
do not have a significant effect on the likelihood to enter a competition. At the same time, we find a 
general difference in most of the performance measures those who choose to compete perform 
better than those who do not choose competitive incentives.  
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With respect to social incentives, they seem to have a stronger effect on productivity than monetary 
incentives. We hypothesize different motivational effects for social and monetary incentives, as we 
find a marginally significant effect of the nature of incentives on the number of correctly solved 
problems. This effect is driven by men; women do not show an increase in performance with social 
incentives. 
Methods 
Subjects 
We invited a sample of people older than 58 (N = 45, 24 women, 21 men) to the experimental 
laboratory (AWI Lab, Heidelberg University, Germany), and a comparison sample of 40 students 
(mean age 24 years, 24 women, 16 men). All participants received a show‐up fee of 3€ and an 
additional payment according to their performance (0.5€/correct answer if paid in the piece‐rate 
treatment, 2€/correct answer for the winner out of four competing subjects in the competition 
treatment, and 1€/correct answer if paid for the high monetary‐incentive treatment). 
The task 
Subjects had to carry out a real effort task, consisting of the addition of five two digit numbers. We 
mainly followed the set‐up by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Subjects were told that the game 
consisted of five parts, and that one of the five parts would be chosen at random for payment. 
In a first round, subjects played the task with a piece rate payment scheme. Subjects were paid 
thence for correct answers without competing. In the second round, a competitive incentive scheme 
was introduced. In this trial, subjects earned an amount of money four times higher than in the piece 
rate scheme if they were the best out of a randomly matched group of four. The other subjects 
earned nothing. In the third round, subjects could decide whether to be paid in a piece rate or in a 
competitive incentive scheme. In the final round, subjects played the task with a modified piece rate 
payment scheme: roughly half of the participants played the game with increased monetary 
incentives, the other half of the participants played the game with social incentives. To investigate 
the motivational effects of social incentives, the experimenter1 read aloud a text asking participants 
to make a last effort and to try to answer as many questions as possible. He stressed that it would be 
very important for the experimenter that subjects really try hard. Subjects were paid as in the 
standard Piece Rate condition. In the high monetary incentives treatment, subjects were paid twice 
the price of the standard piece rate payment for each correct answer. Additionally, participants could 
decide retrospectively whether to be paid in the piece rate or in the competitive incentive scheme 
for round one. 
Based on the literature, we hypothesize a difference in choice of competitive incentives between 
age‐ as well as between gender groups.  
 
Results 
1) Age and gender differences in performance and the choice of competitive incentives 
                                                             
1 All sessions were run by the same experimenter (A.S.). 
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Our first aim was to search for age differences in the choice of competitive incentives. We do not find 
a general age difference in choice: 42.5% of older adults and 37.8% of young adults choose to 
compete in round 3. This age difference is not significant (χ² = 0.197; p = 0.657)2. This holds for both 
sexes: young men choose the competitive incentive scheme in 62.5% of the cases, older men in 
52.4% (χ² = 0.379, p = 0.538), and 29.2% of young women chose to compete, compared to 25% in the 
older women (χ² = 0.105, p = 0.745). 
Table 1 
Group Choice Frequency % 
Young Piece rate 23 57.5 
 Competition 17 42.5 
 Total 40 100 
Older Piece rate 28 62.2 
 Competition 17 37.8 
 Total 45 100 
Male Piece rate 16 43.2 
 Competition 21 56.8 
 Total 37 100 
Female Piece rate 35 72.9 
 Competition 13 27.1 
 Total 48 100 
Older Male Piece rate 10 47.6 
 Competition 11 52.4 
 Total 21 100 
Young Male Piece rate 6 37.5 
 Competition 10 62.5 
 Total 16 100 
Older Female Piece rate 18 75 
 Competition 6 25 
 Total 24 100 
Young Female Piece rate 17 70.8 
 Competition 7 29.2 
 Total 24 100 
 
An effect well known in the literature (Müller & Schwieren, 2011; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) is a 
gender difference in the choice of competitive incentive schemes. We can test whether this holds not 
only for young women, but also for older women. Whereas 56.8% of men choose to compete in 
round 3, only 27.1% of women do so (χ² = 7.666, p = 0.006). If we split the sample by age groups, this 
effect still holds: 29.2% of young women choose the competitive incentive scheme, compared to 
62.5% in men (χ² = 4.365; p = 0.037). This effect is marginally significant in older adults: 52.4% of 
older men choose to compete, compared to 25% of older women (χ² = 3.572, p = 0.059). 
 
To interpret the differences found, it is important to know whether there is an age difference in 
performance in any of the incentive conditions or in improvement between piece rate and 
competition. Table 2 shows that there are age differences in performance in all conditions: in the 
piece rate incentive scheme (t(83) = 2.221, p = 0.029)
3, in the competitive incentive scheme (t(83) = 
2.232, p = 0.028), in the choice incentive scheme (t(83) = 2.549, p = 0.013); and marginally in the social 
or increased piece rate incentive scheme (t(83) = 1.877, p = 0.064). But, there is no age difference in 
                                                             
2
 Unless otherwise mentioned, we report Pearson’s χ² value with an asymptotic two‐sided significance level. 
3 Unless otherwise mentioned, we report p‐values for two‐sided t‐tests. 
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improvement from one to another condition: young and older subjects do not differ in the 
improvement between piece rate and competition incentive scheme (t(83) = 0.111, p = 0.912), nor do 
they differ in improvement between piece rate and the final phase (t(83) = 0.412, p = 0.682). 
If however performance is split by gender and by age, we can show that the age difference in 
performance is only driven by women, and that there is no significant difference in men (cf. table 3): 
young women give more correct answers than older women in the piece‐rate (marginally significant, 
t(46) = 1.988, p = 0.053), in the competitive (marginally significant, t(46) = 1.872, p = 0.068), in the 
choice (t(46) = 2.278, p = 0.027), and in the social or increased monetary incentive scheme (marginally 
significant, t(46) = 1.971, p = 0.055). There are no such differences in men (all p > 0.1). Age differences 
in improvement from piece rate to the competitive or to the social or increased monetary incentive 
scheme do neither appear in men (competitive: t(35) = 0.135, p = 0.893; social/monetary: t(35) = 0.994, 
p = 0.327), nor in women (competitive: t(46) = 0.195, p = 0.846; social/monetary: t(46) = 0.342, p = 
0.734).  
 
Table 2 
Condition Mean young (SD) Mean older (SD) t(83)‐value p‐value 
Piece rate 11.35(5.19) 9.02(4.47) 2.221 0.029 
Competition 12.78(5.07) 10.38(4.83) 2.232 0.028 
Choice 13.25(5.56) 10.49(4.41) 2.549 0.013 
Monetary/Social 12.88(4.97) 10.87(4.88) 1.877 0.064 
Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.43(2.70) 1.36(3.04) 0.111 0.912 
Impr. Piece rate – soc./monet. 1.53(3.48) 1.84(3.65) 0.412 0.682 
N young adults: 40; N older adults: 45 
 
Table 3 
Gender Condition Mean young (SD) Mean older (SD) df t‐value p‐value 
Male Piece rate 12.38(6.87) 9.81(4.52) 35 1.369 0.180 
 Competition 13.44(6.49) 11.00(4.38) 35 1.363 0.181 
 Choice 14.44(7.08) 11.43(4.52) 35 1.574 0.124 
 Monetary/Social 13.06(4.94) 11.76(4.69) 35 0.745 0.461 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.06(2.35) 1.19(3.17) 35 0.135 0.893 
 Impr. Piece rate – soc./monet. 0.69(3.34) 1.95(4.17) 35 0.994 0.327 
Female Piece rate 10.67(3.70) 8.33(4.40) 46 1.988 0.053 
 Competition 12.33(3.94) 9.83(5.22) 46 1.872 0.068 
 Choice 12.46(4.26) 9.67(4.23) 46 2.278 0.027 
 Monetary/Social 12.75(4.35) 10.08(5.00) 46 1.971 0.055 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.67(2.91) 1.50(2.98) 46 0.195 0.846 
 Impr. Piece rate – soc./monet. 2.08(3.53) 1.75(3.22) 46 0.342 0.734 
N young male: 16; N older male: 21; N young female: 24; N older female: 24 
 
In summary, we show in a first step that there is no significant age difference in competitiveness, 
neither in men nor in women. We replicate also the gender difference in competitiveness found 
generally in the literature: women enter a tournament less often than men. This effect holds for both 
age groups. Concerning performance, older adults generally perform worse in all conditions than 
young participants. However, young and older adults do not differ in the increase in performance 
form one condition to another. This means that even if overall performance of older adults on this 
task is worse than that of young adults, the effect of conditions points in the same direction in both 
age groups. Furthermore, the age difference in performance is driven only by women; men do not 
differ significantly on any of the performance measures. 
7 
 
To test for the robustness of these effects found in pairwise comparisons, we also run logistic 
regressions (table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Factor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age ‐.310 
(.509) 
‐.127 
(.796) 
‐.695 
(.654) 
‐.581 
(.713) 
Female ‐1.290 
(.006) 
‐1.201 
(.012) 
‐1.345 
(.055) 
‐1.283 
(.074) 
Piece Rate  .085 
(.115) 
 .044 
(.452) 
Impr. piece rate – comp.  ‐.016 
(.854) 
 ‐.083 
(.401) 
Rank   ‐.615 
(.044) 
‐.615 
(.077) 
Age*gender   .355 
(.714) 
.344 
(.726) 
Constant 1.740 
(.032) 
.661 
(.553) 
2.920 
(.023) 
2.438 
(.137) 
 
R² .124 .166 .185 .212 
Logistic regressions. Dependent variable: choice to compete. N = 85 
 
In these regressions, we confirm that gender is a robust predictor of competitiveness (all p < .1) and 
that neither age, nor the interaction between age group and gender, has significant effects on 
competitiveness. Women are less likely to compete, a result that also holds when controlling for 
absolute and believed performance. On the other hand, age and actual performance (as measured by 
performance on the piece rate trial and by the increase in correct responses from the piece rate to 
the competition trial) do not have a significant effect on the likelihood to enter a competition.  
The second factor that significantly influences competitiveness is self‐ranking. Participants who are 
more confident about their relative performance (as measured by self‐ranking) are more likely to 
compete than participants who are less confident. This result also holds when controlling for actual 
performance (p < .1). 
 
2) Age and gender differences in performance and choice 
In this step, we test whether participants choosing to compete in the choice trial differ in 
performance form participants that chose the piece rate. Participants also ranked their own 
performance in competition in a subsequent step and we can test for differences in beliefs about 
performance in the competition treatment. We expect participants choosing to compete to perform 
better and to rank themselves higher than participants choosing the piece rate incentive scheme. In a 
first step we show data for both age groups together, and subsequently we’ll split groups by age and 
by gender. We will use one‐sided t‐tests for pairwise comparisons, as we have clear hypotheses 
about the direction of the differences. At the end of the section, we will run regressions to test for 
the relative importance of the factors involved.  
Table 5 shows performance in the three first treatments (piece rate, competition, choice), the level 
of improvement from piece rate to competition, and subject’s self‐ranking. In all but the 
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improvement from piece rate to competition, subjects choosing to compete4 perform better than 
subjects who choose the piece rate. In the piece rate treatment, competitive subjects give on 
average 11.50 correct answers in five minutes, compared to 9.20 correct answers in the 
noncompetitive group (t(83) = 2.154, p = 0.017). The effect goes in the same direction for the 
competition treatment (marginally significant, t(83) = 1.626, p = 0.054) and the choice treatment (t(83) 
= 2.024, p = 0.023). Subjects who choose to compete do not differ significantly from subjects who 
choose the piece rate incentive scheme with respect to improvement from the piece rate treatment 
to the competition treatment (t(83) = 0.786, p = 0.217).  
Concerning self‐ranking, competitive subjects rank themselves as significantly better than subjects 
who chose a noncompetitive incentive scheme (t(83) = 2.546, p = 0.007). 
 
Table 5 
Condition Mean piece rate Mean comp. t(83)‐value p‐value 
Piece rate 9.20(4.47) 11.50(5.32) 2.154 0.017 
Competition 10.78(4.87) 12.59(5.21) 1.626 0.054 
Choice 10.88(4.39) 13.15(5.91) 2.024 0.023 
Impr. Piece rate – comp. 1.59(2.74) 1.09(3.06) 0.786 0.217 
Rank 2.14(0.80) 1.68(0.84) 2.546 0.007 
N piece rate: 51; N competition: 34 
 
When focusing on age effects, the difference between participants who chose the piece rate 
incentive scheme and those who chose the competitive incentive scheme only holds for young 
subjects. Those young adults that choose to compete perform better in piece rate trials (marginally 
significant, t(38) = 1.639, p = 0.055), in competition trials (marginally significant, t(38) = 1.598, p = 
0.059), and in choice trials (t(38) = 1.819, p = 0.039). They do not improve more from the piece rate 
trial to the competition trial than the other group (t(38) = 0.143, p = 0.444), but they rank themselves 
significantly higher (marginally significant, t(38) = 1.546, p = 0.065). 
Older adults who chose to compete differ from those who chose the piece rate in none of the 
performance measures but in self‐ranking (t(43) = 1.941, p = 0.030). 
  
                                                             
4 For reasons of text fluency, we classify hereafter subjects that choose to compete as competitive, and 
subjects that chose the piece rate incentive scheme as noncompetitive. We are aware that by attributing the 
predicate “noncompetitive” to the participants we do not necessarily describe participants’ personality, but 
rather their preferences on the current task. 
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Table 6 
Group Condition Mean piece rate Mean comp. df t‐value p‐value 
Young Piece rate 10.22(4.78) 12.88(5.48) 38 1.639 0.055 
 Competition 11.70(4.66) 14.24(5.37) 38 1.598 0.059 
 Choice 11.91(4.42) 15.06(6.52) 38 1.819 0.039 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.48(2.86) 1.35(2.55) 38 0.143 0.444 
 Rank 1.96(0.71) 1.59(0.80) 38 1.546 0.065 
Older Piece rate 8.36(4.10) 10.12(4.95) 43 1.291 0.102 
 Competition 10.04(5.00) 10.94(4.63) 43 0.605 0.274 
 Choice 10.04(4.26) 11.24(4.67) 43 0.883 0.191 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.67(2.70) 0.82(3.56) 43 0.913 0.183 
 Rank 2.29(0.85) 1.76(0.90) 43 1.941 0.030 
Male Piece rate 9.81(5.58) 11.76(5.81) 35 1.028 0.156 
 Competition 11.69(5.28) 12.33(5.70) 35 0.353 0.363 
 Choice 11.94(4.68) 13.33(6.70) 35 0.711 0.241 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.88(1.89) 0.57(3.27) 35 1.417 0.083 
 Rank 1.88(0.81) 1.71(0.96) 35 0.541 0.296 
Female Piece rate 8.91(3.93) 11.08(4.63) 46 1.615 0.057 
 Competition 10.37(4.70) 13.00(4.51) 46 1.741 0.044 
 Choice 10.40(4.24) 12.85(4.62) 46 1.736 0.045 
 Impr. piece rate – comp. 1.46(3.07) 1.92(2.57) 46 0.487 0.315 
 Rank 2.26(0.78) 1.62(0.65) 46 2.640 0.006 
N young piece rate: 23; N young competition: 17; N older piece rate: 28; N older competition: 17; N male piece 
rate: 16; N male competition: 21; N female piece rate: 35; N female competition: 13 
 
When it comes to gender differences, the effect of competitiveness is stronger for women than for 
men. Women choosing competition perform better under forced competition than women choosing 
not to compete (t(46) = 1.741, p = 0.044), whereas there is no such difference for men (t(35) = 0.353, p = 
0.363). For the self‐ranking we also find a difference between the two groups in women (t(46) = 2.640, 
p = 0.006) but not in men (t(35) = 0.541, p = 0.296). In the piece rate and choice trials, as well as in 
improvement from piece rate to competition, we do not find any significant effect of 
competitiveness in men. We do not find a significant effect of competitiveness in the improvement 
variable in women neither, but we find significant differences in the competition (t(46) = 1.741, p = 
0.044), in the choice (t(46) = 1.736, p = 0.045), and in the piece rate treatment (marginally significant, 
t(46) = 1.615, p = 0.057). 
 
In summary, we find a general difference in most of the performance measures (all except 
improvement) between subjects choosing to compete and those preferring piece rate incentives. 
When looking at age differences, the general difference only holds for young participants; older 
participants differ in self‐ranking and in none of the other measures (replicating the finding of 
Charness and Villeval, 2007).  
 
Based on the SPM‐SA theory, we hypothesized that older adults should react more strongly to social 
than to monetary incentives, as social achievement becomes more important with age (table 7). We 
observe however that subjects in both, the monetary and the social group improve significantly from 
piece rate (social t(22) = 2.558, p = 0.018; monetary t(21) = 2.177, p = 0.041). This improvement is also 
marginally significant in young adults (social t(19) = 1.945, p = 0.067; monetary t(19) = 1.959, p = 0.065). 
The improvement from competition to the final phase is not significant in any of the groups. 
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Table 7 
Age Incentives Improvement from Mean df t‐value p‐value 
Young Social Piece rate 1.70(3.91) 19 1.945 0.067 
  Competition ‐0.15(2.72) 19 0.247 0.808 
 Monetary Piece rate 1.35(3.08) 19 1.959 0.065 
  Competition 0.35(3.35) 19 0.468 0.645 
Older Social Piece rate 2.04(3.83) 22 2.558 0.018 
  Competition 0.61(2.54) 22 1.151 0.262 
 Monetary Piece rate 1.64(3.53) 21 2.177 0.041 
  Competition 0.36(2.63) 21 0.649 0.523 
 
When directly comparing social to monetary incentives, it turns out that social incentives have a 
slightly stronger effect on productivity. On average, subjects solve 12.77 problems in the social 
incentives group, but only 10.83 problems in the monetary incentives group (marginally significant, 
t(83) = 2.025, p = 0.074). If however we split the sample by age groups, this effect disappears: older 
and young adults taken separately do not seem to differentiate between social and monetary 
incentives. Sample size however is now small. 
When splitting the sample by gender instead of age, it becomes evident that the effect is driven by 
men. Men solve 14 problems correctly in the social incentive condition, and 10.74 in the monetary 
incentives condition (marginally significant, t(35) = 1.972, p = 0.057). Women, on the other hand solve 
11.88 problems in the social incentives condition versus 10.91 in the monetary incentives condition 
(t(46) = 0.689, p = 0.494). 
Table 8 
Group Mean social Mean monetary df t‐value p‐value 
Young 13.90(5.64) 11.85(4.10) 38 1.316 0.196 
Older 11.78(5.13) 9.91(4.52) 43 1.298 0.201 
Male 14.00(5.95) 10.74(3.97) 35 1.972 0.057 
Female 11.88(4.92) 10.91(4.79) 46 0.689 0.494 
N young social: 20; N young monetary: 20; N older social: 23; N older  
monetary: 22; N male social: 18; N male monetary: 19; N female social: 
25; N female monetary: 23 
 
In the following, we report regressions on each of the performance measures.  
In the piece rate incentive scheme, we regressed the only two measures at hand at this point of the 
game, namely age and gender, on the amount of correct solutions in this trial. The regression reveals 
that age, but not gender, has a significant effect on performance, and that young adults perform 
better than older adults. However, when controlling for the interaction between age and gender, this 
effect disappears.  
For the competitive incentive scheme, we performed in a first step the same regression as for the 
piece rate incentive scheme, with the same overall result: age significantly influences performance, 
gender does not. In a second step, we included performance on the piece rate trial and the 
interaction between age group and performance as additional regressors. Not surprisingly, 
performance on the previous trial has a strong effect on performance on the competition trial, 
increasing the regression coefficient from .069 to .701 and cancelling out any significant effect of age.  
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In the choice condition, subjects had the possibility to choose their preferred incentive scheme, and 
we introduced into the model a binary variable for choice. The effect on performance of choosing or 
not choosing to compete is nonsignificant (p = 0.134). In the second model, we again introduced 
performance on the piece rate trial and the interaction between age and performance as 
supplementary regressors. In addition, we introduced a regressor for the interaction between the 
choice variable and performance. Performance on the piece rate trial has a strong effect on 
performance in the choice trial, increasing the R² from .130 to .734. None of the other regressors 
reveals being significant. 
For the final incentive scheme, where subjects performed with social incentives or increased 
monetary incentives, we introduced in the first model age, gender, and the nature of incentives as 
regressors. Whereas gender does not influence significantly performance on the final trial, age has a 
significant effect (p = .050), and the nature of incentives seems to influence performance (p = 0.075) 
as well. In the second model, we added performance on the piece rate trial and the interaction 
between age and performance as regressors. Performance becomes the only significant variable 
explaining scores on the final incentive scheme. 
 
Table 9 
 Piece rate Competition Choice Final 
Factor Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Age ‐.248 
(.022) 
‐.285 
(.424) 
‐.245 
(.024) 
‐.053 
(.717) 
‐.270 
(.011) 
.078 
(.571) 
‐.212 
(.050) 
‐.057 
(.747) 
Gender ‐.160 
(.135) 
‐.196 
(.573) 
‐.112 
(.297) 
.021 
(.741) 
‐.130 
(.236) 
‐.049 
(.434) 
‐.112 
(.296) 
.009 
(.907) 
Age*Gender  .051 
(.913) 
      
Piece rate    .812 
(.000) 
 .997 
(.000) 
 .688 
(.005) 
Age*Piece rate    .020 
(.924) 
 ‐.250 
(.213) 
 .043 
(.866) 
Competition     .165 
(.134) 
‐.088 
(.530) 
  
Competition*Piece rate      .124 
(.442) 
  
Incentives       ‐.201 
(.062) 
‐.080 
(.295) 
Constant 16.317 
(.000) 
16.881 
(.004) 
17.069 
(.000) 
3.385 
(.206) 
17.438 
(.000) 
3.107 
(.254) 
17.767 
(.000) 
5.492 
(.095) 
R² .082 .082 .069 .701 .130 .734 .092 .533 
Linear regressions. Dependent variables: number of correctly solved problems. N = 85. 
 
In summary, the age, but not the gender, of participants influences performance in all four incentive 
schemes. When controlling for baseline‐performance, (measured by performance on the initial piece‐
rate trial), the effect of age is cancelled out. As baseline‐performance is influenced by the age of 
participants, we controlled also for the interaction between age and baseline performance. The 
interaction term however does not have a significant effect.  
Another noteworthy effect is the influence of ”competitiveness” on performance in the first 
regression model of the choice trial. Even though the effect is only approaching marginal significance, 
we have shown earlier (cf. section 2) that choosing to compete is linked to performance on the 
choice trial. 
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In the first regression model of performance on the final incentive scheme, we introduced the nature 
of incentives (social or increased monetary) as regressor. Nature of incentives marginally significantly 
explains performance on the final trial, with a stronger effect of social compared to increased 
monetary incentives.  
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, our main aim was to explore age differences in the reaction to incentives. To 
achieve this goal, subjects participated in a real effort task with four incentive schemes: piece rate, 
tournament, choice between piece rate and tournament, and social or increased monetary 
incentives. On the whole, we replicated most of the effects previously known in the literature, and 
answered our main hypotheses. 
More specifically, with respect to age and gender differences, we found that: 
Concerning performance, older adults generally perform worse in all conditions than young 
participants. This effect supposedly is due to age differences in cognitive domains such as processing 
speed (Salthouse & Madden, 2008) and fluid intelligence (Bugg et al., 2006). Young and older adults 
do however not differ in the increase in performance in between the conditions. This shows that 
even though overall performance of older adults on this task may be worse than that of young 
adults, the effect of conditions points in the same direction in both age groups. When controlling for 
gender and the interaction of gender and age, the age effect however disappears. Performance 
increases from the piece rate to all subsequent trials. Subjects do neither increase in performance 
from competition to the choice trial, nor do they increase from competition to the final trial. One 
possible interpretation of the latter result could be that subjects are equally motivated to perform 
well by competitive incentives and by piece rate settings with increased performance incentives.  
Another noteworthy effect is the influence of competitiveness on performance. Like Charness and 
Villeval, we find a general difference in most of the performance measures (all except improvement 
between trials) for competitive and noncompetitive participants, competitive participants 
performing better than their noncompetitive pairs.  
Unlike the common stereotype that older adults “are less willing to learn, and implicitly less 
interested in working hard and competing” (Charness and Villeval, 2007), in the setting of our 
experiment we do not find decreased competitiveness, neither in men, nor in women. We replicate 
also the gender difference in competitiveness found in the literature (Müller and Schwieren, 2011; 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007): women enter a tournament less often than men. This effect holds 
for both age groups. The two factors that explain the most of this variance of tournament entry are 
the gender of participants and self‐ranking. Participants who are more confident about their relative 
performance are more likely to compete than participants who are less confident. Furthermore, 
women are less likely to compete (a result that also holds when controlling for absolute and believed 
performance). Age does not have a significant effect on the likelihood to enter a competition. 
 
Like competitiveness on the choice trial, nature of incentives explains part of the variance of 
performance on the final trial. As predicted by the SPF‐SA theory, social incentives seem to have a 
stronger effect on productivity than monetary incentives. The performance‐increasing effect of 
increased monetary incentives or additional social incentives seems to have a similar strength as a 
competitive environment, as we did not find significant increases in productivity from the 
competition trial to the final trial neither with monetary nor with social incentives. 
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With respect to the SPF‐SA theory, in our experiment, we tested the effect of social need satisfaction 
with an emphasis on status (being taken seriously, achieve more than others) and behavioural 
confirmation (doing things well, being useful, contribution to a common goal). The need for affection 
(feeling that you are liked, empathized with, etc.), on the other hand, plays a less important role in 
our set‐up. In the social/monetary treatment, behavioural confirmation is in our eyes the most 
prominent need that can be satisfied, as the experimenter asks subjects to make a last effort (i.e. 
doing things well) because it is very important for the success of the study (i.e. contribution to a 
common goal). The competition treatment, and to some extend also the choice treatment, have 
rather a status satisfaction dimension, as participants here have the possibility to achieve more than 
others. Whereas in young adults, status and behavioural confirmation are two needs that are easily 
fulfilled, older adults have less opportunities to achieve these needs due to changes in life situation 
(e.g. retirement), and are thence more prone to react to conditions that enable them to fulfill these 
needs (Steverink and Lindenberg, 2002). Even though we do not observe strong differences between 
age groups in the reaction to status and behavioural confirmation treatments, we observe a neat 
increase in performance in both age groups in reaction to social‐need‐satisfaction conditions, 
compared to the piece‐rate treatment, where any of the social needs can be fulfilled. Especially the 
social/monetary treatment, in which confounding factors like task familiarity or learning should not 
play a role, shows that behavioural confirmation has a stronger effect on performance than a 
doubling of the financial incentives. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Concluding, older subjects seem to differ in their reaction from younger subjects, but not always in 
the way stereotypically expected. While the differences are not large, they do show that we need to 
differentiate not only between young and older adults, but also between men and women. Overall, 
older women’s performance is slightly lower than that of younger women, whereas we do not find 
this age difference in men. When it comes to social incentives, the motivational effect of social 
incentives seems to be higher than the motivational effect of monetary incentives. 
More work is necessary to fully understand the implications of our results for workplace design, 
especially focusing on social incentives and also studying over‐ and underconfidence in older 
populations. Further experiments should also look at age‐mixed settings, as this might be the more 
relevant setup with respect to real‐world workplaces. 
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